The fact that auditors are paid by the companies they audit creates an inherent conflict of interest with investors who rely on the audit report in their capital allocation decisions. We analyze how the provision of financial statement insurance could eliminate this conflict of interest and properly aligns the incentives of auditors with those of shareholders.
audit committees, and reduction of the auditor's involvement with the client. 4 But the Act does not untie the auditor/management knot: auditors continue to be hired and paid by the firms they audit.
Without joining the debate about the effectiveness of the Act, 5 and as an alternative to or supplement to its mandates, this paper introduces a market-based financial statement insurance scheme 6 designed to eliminate conflicts of interest that inhere in the auditor-client relationship and, at the same time, to credibly signal the quality of financial statements.
The model developed in this paper shows that such a scheme would result in security prices that reflect the differential qualities of financial statements and thus become better guides to resource allocation.
The social value of ex-ante self reporting has been recognized in the literature (Kaplow and Shavell [1994] ). In essence, the FSI mechanism involves induced truthful "self reporting"
through the auditor's attestation of the quality of the financial statements even when such quality is poor and expected to trigger market sanctions when made public. 7 In contrast, the current structure of incentives driving auditors' behavior may not elicit unbiased reports.
Auditors are paid by the companies they audit which creates an inherent conflict of interest that is endemic to the relation between the manager (the principal) and the auditor (the agent). We analyze, first, the financial statement quality equilibrium under the existing legal and regulatory regime governing auditing when managers obtain significant benefits both direct and indirect when they successfully raise capital. Defining quality as the inverse of the probability of overstatement in financial statements, we show that the natural equilibrium 4 Romano (2004), having reviewed an extensive body of literature concludes that the Act's mandates were seriously misconceived as they are not likely to improve audit quality or otherwise enhance firm performance and benefit investors as Congress intended. 5 A strong critique of the Sarbanes Oxley Act may be found in Butler and Ribstein (2006) who observe that "[..one of its
consequences is] the placing of significant new burdens and risks on auditors, thereby forcing additional inefficient risk-bearing that makes it even harder for smaller and riskier firms to enter the public markets;" 6 The idea of financial statement insurance was first floated in a short opinion piece for popular audience in the New York Susan Lee, A Market Remedy for Our Nasty Accounting Virus, re-exposed the idea in the Wall Street Journal. 7 Lacker and Weinberg [1989] study the characterization of optimal no-falsification contracts from a general perspective. A considerable body of literature argues that injuries associated with purchased products would be more efficiently handled under contracts rather than mandated regulations or torts.
is one where a bottom quality of financial statements is chosen (with a high probability of overstatement in the financial reports). Under these circumstances, firms that potentially yield low rate of return (low fundamental value) cannot be identified easily and are over funded relative to firms characterized by a high rate of return (high fundamental value). We show analytically that the introduction of financial statement insurance can lead to a better assessment of financial statement quality resulting in a much more accurate identification of low value firms.
The basic structure of Financial Statement Insurance (FSI) can be described as follows (details may be found in Appendix 2, based on Ronen (2002). 8 Instead of appointing and paying auditors, companies would purchase financial statement insurance that provides coverage to investors against losses suffered as a result of misrepresentation in financial reports.
The insurance coverage that the companies are able to obtain is publicized, as are the premiums paid for that coverage. The insurance carriers would then appoint and pay the auditors, who attest to the accuracy of the financial statements of the prospective insurance clients.
Those firms announcing higher limits of coverage and smaller premiums would distinguish themselves in the eyes of the investors as companies with higher quality financial statements.
In contrast, those with smaller or no coverage or higher premiums will reveal themselves as firms with lower quality financial statements. Every company will be eager to get higher coverage and pay smaller premiums lest it be identified as the latter. A sort of Gresham's law would be set in operation, resulting in a flight to quality.
According to sound principles of corporate governance, auditors are supposed to be the agents of the shareholders, but in practice, although shareholders vote on management's recommendation of which auditor to hire. It is the management of the company that engages the auditor and ultimately pays for the services. The fact that CEO's and CFO's control the fees paid for auditing and consulting services allows them to elicit actions, including opinions and assurances, that it desires from the auditor. The risk of losing fees from a long-term audit engagement -even in light of the limitations on non-audit services imposed by the 8 Cunningham (2004a) [1] provides a comprehensive discussion of the legal and institutional implications and ramifications of the FSI idea presented in this paper. Furthermore, Cunningham (2004b) [2] proposes a model legislative Act of the FSI scheme.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 -may secure auditor compliance with management's objectives.
We argue that the imperfect alignment of interests between managers and shareholders and the intractable conflict of interest imposed on auditors can be rectified through an agency relationship between the auditor and an appropriate principal, whose economic interests are aligned with the goal of promoting the quality of the financial statement. 9 Within a free market mechanism, insurers can serve the role of such an intermediary.
The critical features of the FSI scheme underlying this study are: (i) the effect of publicizing the premium charged to different firms; and (ii) the shift of control over the auditor's compensation and, hence, incentive structure from management to the insurer. We seek to formalize these two features and to demonstrate that FSI, when linked with appropriate disclosure provisions, leads firms to improve the quality of their disclosures voluntarily. Section 2 develops the formal details concerning the informational structure of the market and the trading strategies of investors (technical details in Appendix 1). After developing this structure, we present the economic decision problem faced by the firm in determining financial statement quality. We lay out four programs corresponding to different economic settings where financial satement insurance could play a beneficial role. The timelines for each of these programs is given in Figure 1 . Section 3 provides the main results with Propositions 1-4 stating the equilibrium that derives in each of these programs. Section 5 provides the conclusions while Appendix 2 provides more details about how FSI may operate in practice.
Model
We develop a model in which firms try to attract capital through their financial reports. The firm's management benefits from obtaining capital, but there is a social waste if firms with 9 Such a principal (intermediary) should not benefit from the price at which securities are traded. A realignment of interests along these lines would contribute to restoring the "complete fidelity to the public's trust" that Chief Justice Burger insisted on in a celebrated opinion: "By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust" [465 U.S. 805, 818].
associated with return r i , which we also refer to as the firm's type. The type of each firm f is drawn randomly by nature at the start of the period and is independent of other firms.
The firms then issue financial reports and try to attract capital.
The strategic tool for obtaining capital is an audited financial report that is issued to investors. Although this report may not be directly falsified, it can be manipulated indirectly through a reduction in the quality of the statements. 11 At the start, the managers of firm f are assumed to obtain a private signal, ω l , about their firm's type where l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} represents the set of L possible signals observable by the firm. We denote by P (i|ω l ) the probability that the end-of-period rate of return will be r i for a firm f that receives a private signal, ω l . Based on his private signal, the firm's manager chooses accounting policies that may increase or decrease their financial statement quality (FSQ). FSQ is determined both by the firms choice of internal quality, q, and the auditor's input, e; the overall quality written as x is given by a function Λ(q, e). After the firm f's rate of return is realized, a financial report θ f is disseminated to investors. Associated with each report θ f is some value r θ f , which we shall refer to as firm f's implied by θ f rate-of-return. r θ j may be different from the actual rate-of-return of firm f, r i . However, investors will not blindly accept this value, r θf ; instead, they will use this implied rate as well as their perceptions about audit quality to "infer" a probability distribution over possible rates-of-return for firm f.
Investors observe the report θ f and the associated (implied) rate-of-return, r θf , but they cannot observe the FSQ choice q, e or x. Therefore, investors make conjectures about FSQ and use these beliefs to infer a rate-of-return based on θ f . Denoting investor beliefs about the FSQ of firm f by ν f , we write P (i|j, ν f ) for the posterior probability assigned by investors to the event that the true rate-of-return is r i given that the implied rate-of-return is r θf . 12 The 10 More generally, it is possible to consider a multi-period consumption-investment model where investing in some of the projects reduces overall welfare calculated across several periods. 11 A typical example may be the choice of classifying a capital lease as an operating lease by using a higher than warranted discount rate. 12 Hereafter, whenever the context does not lead to confusion, we may write θ = J to mean r θ f = r j expected rate-of-return associated with this posterior probability distribution is denotedr f :
We assume that there is a minimum threshold rate, r * , such that funding firms with rates of return less than r * results in a social loss. r * is a random variable with a distribution F (r * )
that represents the social cost of capital. r * is assumed to be independent of firm's rates of return. In the first-best scenario, in which the true rate-of-return is perfectly observed, only firms with rates of return higher than r * will obtain capital. In a second-best scenario in which investors do not know each firm's type, they analyze the report, θ f , and fund firm f if the inferred rate-of-return,r f , is greater than the threshold rate r * .
If the valuer f ≥ r * , investors contribute one unit of capital to the firm. 13 The managers of a firm typically benefit in both pecuniary and non-pecuniary ways from capital inflows.
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We represent the (portion) of the value of the firm appropriated by management by B (for benefits). In other words, by ensuring a capital inflow, the firm's management generates both a return which is passed back to shareholders and a benefit B for themselves. In this setting, low quality financial statements that misdirect capital lead to two basic types of losses.
The two types of loss are described below from the perspective of an investor considering whether to fund firm f. Let k denote the true type of this firm. A unit of capital invested in f earns a return r k . However, the decision to invest in the firm is based on the inferred rate of return (or equivalently inferred type),r f . Ifr f > r * but r k < r * , investors suffer a loss of 1 × (r * − r k ) (recall that the investment involves one unit of capital). While this type of loss is straightforward, there is a second type of loss that also results from inferior accounting quality. Because investors are unable to distinguish the high quality firms from 13 We use the term "capital inflow" and henceforth also "funding" in a broad sense to include any purchases of the firm's stock by investors -whether in a public offering or in secondary trading. In the latter case, the purchase of stock exerts an upward pressure on its price thereby decreasing the firm's cost of capital. The firm would be able to finance investment projects that it could not afford without the price increase (price inflation in the case of misrepresentation). For example it can do so by selling treasury stock at the higher price, obtaining debt financing at lower cost due to a lower debt-equity ratio, etc.; management, as well, benefits through the increased value of stock and options holdings. 14 Managers may use the capital infusion to either enlarge their own firm or takeover other firms. This is widely reported in the financial literature as "empire-building" or as "Hubris".
low quality firms, some high quality firms may not be funded. So, if a firm of high quality, r k is not funded, investors lose the amount 1 × (r k − r * ). The total cost of misinvestment is a sum of these two losses (see the Example below for a complete calculation).That is, an inflated financial statement not only draws capital towards an inferior firm, it also indirectly starves superior firms (whose "honest" reports are discounted in the same way as "dishonest reports) leading to both an actual loss and an opportunity loss.
Information Structure and Investor Beliefs
In this section, we develop the structure underlying the investor's determination of an expected rate-of-return for firm f after observing the report θ f . This process leading to Equation 2, is built on two economic features:
1. The joint relationship of true underlying type and reported type for each level of FSQ; We parameterize FSQ using two vectors, q ∈ Q ⊂ A and e ∈ E ⊂ B where Q and E are closed bounded cubes in some arbitrary dimensional real vector spaces, A and B . We make the natural assumption that the auditor's effort level choice, e ∈ Eis perfectly observed by the firm that hired the auditor. Hence, e is chosen at a first best level in response to a forcing contract designed by the firm.
q represents the internal quality and is chosen by the firm; e represents the quality of the auditor and is chosen in response to the incentives provided by the firm. Associated with any pair (q, e) is the FSQ x, i.e, x = Λ(q, e) for some vector-valued continuous function Λ which is increasing in (each component of) q and e, that is, Λ preserves the co-ordinate wise partial order. For each x, the set {(q, e)|Λ(q, e) ≥ x} is a bounded convex set (in some arbitrary real vector space). Let i denote the type of the firm and j the financial report. Then for each level of FSQ, x, we have a joint distribution denoted by P (j, i|x). We assume that the level of FSQ
x has no productive effects, that is, it does not affect the (unconditional) distribution of true
representing FSQ has a natural component-wise partial order; that is, for x, y ∈ X, y x if and only if every component of x is at least as great as the corresponding component of y. The next assumption develops a systematic ordering relationship between P (j, i|x) and P (j, i|y) consistent with the partial order of y being lower FSQ than x whenever y x.
Lower FSQ (in the natural co-ordinate partial order) ought to "increase" the probability of overstatement; in addition, higher FSQ should make it easier to separate out true types.
To capture these two features, we first assume that all errors in the financial report are overstatements; that is, a firm f of type i only receives reports θ f = j ≥ i. 15 Then we make the following assumption (further details are given in Appendix 1): Recall that at the time of the report, firms know their true rate of return. The idea is that firms will correct any downside error by providing correct information about their type but will allow overstatements to proceed uncorrected. 16 Given our assumption that firm types are drawn independently, all firms with the same private signal ω l face identical decision problems regarding the optimal implementation of quality. We simplify the belief structure by assuming that each firm beliefs ν is given by (see Appendix 1 for the details):
It is worth noting that the expression in Equation (2) depends only on the beliefs regarding the FSQ, ν l , chosen by the firm with private signal ω l rather than their actual choice x * l . The basic theme underlying our model is that firms can mislead investors by setting x * l < ν l ; however, rational expectations requires that in equilibrium, the actual choice of FSQ and market conjectures have to coincide. The equilibrium we derive takes both these economic requirements into account. We return to this analysis after developing the liability structure that counteracts firms desires to set low levels of FSQ.
Liability Structure
Both firms and auditors face penalties under provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts and other statutory and case law when they issue financial reports that expost are found to be misleading. Additionally, low effort and low quality financial statements may impose additional penalties on the auditor in the form of reputation loss. Our goal is to show that the allocative efficiency of capital increases with the provision of FSI. To make this point clearly, we fix the total recoveries obtainable through the legal system while varying the mechanism by which these recoveries are collected by investors. The firm's expected liability is denoted by L f (x). We denote the auditor's expected liability and liability loss as L a (x, e) to emphasize the fact that the auditor sets the level of e and is separately responsible for any errors in the audit process. The structure that we impose on the expected liability is:
(1) L f (x) decreases in x (under the usual partial order on x) and L a (x, e) decreases in both
x and e. Notice that L a (x, e) may be equivalently written as L a (Λ(q, e), e) where the with a given private signal ω l has a single quality choice assigned to it. A more general formulation would set the perceived quality ν l to be a probability measure over possible levels of FSQ.
17 The summation in the last expression over i only extends up to j because all errors are over statements -P (j|i, ν l ) = 0 for
composite function is decreasing in both q and e.
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Funding and Managerial Benefits
The managers of the firms choose the level of FSQ to maximize their own benefits. These benefits derive from a successful ability to raise capital. The manager's ultimate payoff depends both on firm value and success in raising new capital. Firm value depends on the return on investment less any potential damages that may have to be paid to (pre-existing shareholders) for inflated financial reports. In addition, managers derive a direct benefit, B, whenever they are successful in raising capital. 19 We assume, for simplicity, that all firms have an investment, I, absent any new capital or the amount I + 1 if new capital is raised.
Managers may appropriate a portion B of the new capital as direct benefits. 20 In this setting, denoting the probability of funding firm f by F P f , the Expected firm value when a private signal ω l is observed, FSQ x is implemented, and audit fee F is paid may be written as:
Assuming that the managers own α of the firm and divert some portion of the funding, B, towards direct benefits, the managers payoff function becomes:
We shall assume that the manager benefits more from direct consumption than he looses in firm value as a result of his consumption. That is,
If FSI is available with an associated premium π f , then the managers' payoff may be written as:
After receiving a private signal ω l , the managers choose FSQ x so as to maximize the payoff in Equation 4 or 6 depending on whether FSI is available.
The last part of our model development concerns the role of the auditor.
Auditor Incentives and decisions
The auditor is the principal informational intermediary in the trading of seasoned equities.
In our model, we take as a given that the auditor must supply information to investors but that the quality of this information depends on the incentives provided by the auditor's employer (either the firm or the insurer). Our goal is to study firm-investor interactions and not audit contracts or auditor behavior. To this end, we focus the incentive problem for auditors solely on whether the true FSQ is revealed to the insurer.
The auditor is assumed to be risk-neutral and faces a cost of effort denoted by C(e). Let
F (x, e) denote the fee that ensures that the auditor breaks-even, that is,
We assume that the fee F (x, e) will induce the auditor to exert the effort level e whenever the firm has implemented FSQ q and x = Λ(q, e). The ability to impose ex-post penalties, such as adjustment of fees or refusal to renew the auditors contract will force the auditor to implement the level of effort e desired by the firm as long as F (x, e) is large enough to cover both direct and indirect costs. 22 We will also assume that for a given level of overall quality, 21 A minor difference between the insurance and non-insurance situation should be noted. If managers "pump and dump", they will be able to sell before the legal penalty L f (x) is imposed whereas the insurance premium π f is unavoidable as it is paid ex-ante. However, in the interest of keeping the comparison across the different settings as "clean" as possible, we assume that the managers will have to face the reduction in share value associated with low quality choices either as higher premia or as a higher litigation payout. 22 Note that in our setting the entity hiring the auditor observes the latter's effort and so it is able to enforce a "first best"
effort consistent with the hiring entity's objective. Thus, in the case of the auditee hiring the auditor, the former's objective, and the corresponding desired "first best" effort, may not be necessarily beneficial from the standpoint of shareholders or society as a whole. For example, the hiring entity may design a hiring contract that induces a low-quality financial statements When FSI is available, a further consideration enters the picture -the report to the insurer about the choice of FSQ. We denote this report byx and write F (x, x, e) for the fees when the auditor is incentivized to reportx while the implemented quality of the firm is x. We assume that the report to the insurer is private and does not increase the auditor's exposure to investor litigation. However, the insurer can demand an ex-post adjustment (either in the insurance payout or through increased future premia) ifx = x. We denote this adjustment by σ(x, x). The adjustment will be paid by the firm when the insurer's contract is with the firm whereas the transfer can be imposed on the auditor if the auditor is hired by the insurer. In addition, when the auditor is hired by the insurer, the auditor's liability will be paid by the insurer and the (initial) audit fee will be unaffected by the quality level
x. Gathering all these points together, the audit fee F (x, x, e) has the following structure:
(auditor hired by firm)
(FSI : auditor hired by insurer)
We note that under FSI, the total payoff of the auditor is C(e) − σ(x, x) which does depend onx, x and e so the strategy of revealing x truthfully can be implemented. To sum up, when the firm hires the auditor, the auditor can be costlessly induced to report the quality level favored by the firm (see also Proposition 3) whereas when the insurer hires the auditor, the ex-ante audit fees are independent of the reported quality but auditors face an ex-post transfer if they have misrepresented the quality level implemented by the firm.
which may be beneficial to the hiring entity but injurious to shareholders or to society as a whole. The hazard of the auditor misrepresenting the quality of the disclosure is present when the auditor is hired by the auditee and not by the insurer. Other than complicating the analysis, introducing moral hazard with respect to the auditor's effort would not qualitatively change the results. 23 This assumption simplifies the belief structure in that any beliefs about x translate to unique beliefs about q and e.
Formalization
We now state the formal programs for the strategic choice of financial statement quality for a firm f receiving a private signal ω l under several different economic regimes. There are two basic aspects of FSI that we need to examine:
(1) The effects of the public disclosure of FSI premia (2) The economic rationale for allowing the insurer to control the auditor's contract While both these features are part of FSI, they are driven by different incentive problems. (II) FSI is available, auditors are hired by the client-firm and are truly independent; that is, auditors cannot be induced to overstate FSQ (although they can be induced to lower audit effort). Investors update their beliefs about FSQ after observing the FSI premium.
(III) FSI is available auditors are hired by the client-firm and can be induced by the clientfirm to overstate FSQ. Investors update their beliefs about FSQ after observing the FSI premium.
(IV) FSI is available, premia are disclosed and the auditor is hired by the insurer. Investors update their beliefs about FSQ after observing the FSI premium.
As the programs are stated, we will highlight features that distinguish each of the programs.
The time lines for the four programs are shown in Figure 1 on the next page. Denote the observed profile of insurance premiums by π, where π f is the premium charged to firm
represent the inferred return expected by investors from firm f after observing the report θ f and an insurance premium π f . Let F P f (x, e|ω k , π) denote the funding probability expected by a firm f that receives a private signal ω k and implements FSQ x under a premium profile π, that is, under beliefs that a firm receiving private signal ω l implements FSQ ν l and is offered a premium π l . The objective function for firm f is to implement FSQ level and audit effort {x * , e * } and secure a favorable insurance premium, π f , so as to maximize the probability of funding.
The insurer is assumed to break-even through a suitable choice of ex-ante premium, π f , and an ex-post adjustment. This assumption of ex-post break-even is common in the insurance literature and represents the ability to impose costs on the insured in the form of higher future premia. In our context, we assume that the insurer sets an initial premium π f (x) based on the auditor's report regarding the quality of the financial statements and imposes an ex-post adjustment σ(x, x) (on firm or auditor depending on the context) that allows the insurer to break-even. However, the insurer does not wish to depend on this ex-post adjustment and tries to make it as small as possible. Lastly, we assume that the audit fee, F (x, e) in Programs I & II, and F (x, e) in Programs III & IV, implements the audit effort e and reportx by the auditor.
Program I: Current Regime
subject to
Program II: Premia Disclosed with auditor hired by the client-firm and reportsx = x
Program III: Premia Disclosed with a (non-independent) auditor hired by client-firm
The objective function faced by managers in all four programs is to maximize benefits less In all four settings, the cost to investors of false reporting has a direct component that is remedied (at least partially) through the penalties imposed by the litigation system, and an indirect one measured as misapplied investment. As we are interested only in the relative levels of the indirect cost, we hold the direct costs, i.e., the litigation penalties constant across regimes and ensure that these costs are borne by the client-firm in all settings. In Program I, this cost is paid directly by the client-firm. In Programs (II) -(IV), the expected costs are paid out by the firm as an insurance premium (note that with risk neutrality, the actual uncertain payment is the same, in utility terms, as the expected payout to both client-firm and insurer). In Program II, where the auditor is truly independent, FSQ is assumed to be known by the insurer whereas in Programs III and IV the insurer has to rely either on the firm or the auditor to make an assessment of FSQ.
The critical difference across Programs III and IV lies in the ex-post settlement associated with the (BE) constraint. In Program III, the insurer breaks-even by settling up with the client-firm through a premium adjustment, σ(x, x) whereas in Program IV, the settling up takes place with the auditor. In fact, the structure ensures thatx = x in equilibrium in
Program IV and ex-post transfers do not take place in equilibrium. 24 In Program III, the true quality of financial statements is identified only ex-post through the litigation process and if benefits to funding are large enough, the firm is willing to pay these ex-post transfers (after the true type is revealed) in exchange for the ex-ante benefits of funding.
The (RE) equation expresses the rational expectations constraint that the beliefs about the FSQ implemented by a firm with private signal ω i , ν i coincides with the actual equilibrium choices, {x * i , e * i }. In contrast, the objective function of the manager is maximized holding beliefs constant. This structure is chosen to incorporate the following two economic features:
(1) managers have the ability to set low FSQ's without being detected ex-ante but (2) market beliefs will stabilize in equilibrium at FSQ levels that will not be undercut by the manager.
We now turn to our main analysis concerning the equilibrium levels of FSQ that are chosen by firms under each of the Programs, (I) -(IV). In Programs (II)-(IV), the insurance premium is observable by investors. When the firm implements its optimal level of x, it has to take into account the reaction of investors to the financial report that will eventually be issued, and this reaction depends either on prior beliefs regarding FSQ (Program I) or posterior beliefs formed after observing the insurance premium charged to the firm (Programs
(II)-(IV)). FSQ is assumed to be observable to the insurer in Program II but not observable in Programs (III) -(IV).
24 Generally, it is in the insurer's interests to force truthful revelation of x as this avoids costly ex-post renegotiation.
To explain the dynamics of investor-firm interactions arising from the introduction of FSI,
we analyze the equilibrium in all four Programs. Our goal is to show that the implemented level of FSQ is highest when insurance premia are revealed ex-ante to investors and the auditor is an agent of the insurer rather than the firm. We start with the simpler setting where the auditor is truly independent and reports the level of FSQ implemented by the firm to the insurer. Note that this does not affect the quality of the audit or the probability of errors in the financial report. All it does is to ensure that the premium truly reflects the FSQ implemented by the firm. We show that in this case (Program II), a simple disclosure of FSI premium leads to a race to the "top" and all firms implement high FSQ. In contrast, if the firm can induce the auditor to misreport FSQ to the insurer, Program(III), all potential benefits of supplying FSI are lost providing a rationale for the auditor to become an agent of the insurer Program (IV).
We begin with a lemma that lists the basic properties of the inference process. Before stating the lemma, it is useful to summarize some notation about funding probabilities. For any firm f and any beliefs ν, denote the probability that a firm f with report θ f = j will be funded (under beliefs ν) by F P f (j| ν). The total probability of funding (taken across all reports) under FSQ choice x, denoted by F P f (x| ν), is given by:
The problem faced by a firm f is to choose the optimal level of FSQ, x, given its private information, ω l . This decision in turn depends on two factors:
(1) The probability that a firm with private information ω l implementing some FSQ x will receive funding; and (2) The expected loss through litigation if the firm implements quality x and consequently inflates the implied rate-of-return.
We develop the funding effects of quality choice in this section and the litigation structure in Section 2.2. The probability that a firm f observing private information ω l and implementing quality x when the market holds beliefs ν is written F P f (x|ω l , ν). Using Bayes rule:
With this notation, we have the following result:
Lemma 1 (Reports, inferences and funding probabilities)
Letr jf denote the inferred rate of return of firm f under beliefs ν and observed report rθ j .
(
1) For any beliefs ν f regarding the FSQ of firm f, a higher implied rate of return implies a (strictly) greater inferred rate of return, that is,r jf is increasing in j.
( 
Proof:
See Appendix 1.
The next proposition shows how the probability of funding for firm f changes in the FSQ choices.
Lemma 2 (Funding probability and FSQ choice)
For any firm f and any beliefs ν, F P f (x|ω l , ν) is a strictly decreasing function of, quality, x.
Holding beliefs fixed, a reduction in quality (i.e., an inflation of the expected report) results
in a larger probability of funding.
Proof:
Fix any beliefs ν. From Lemma (1: (1)), F P f (j| ν) is always increasing in reported type θ f = j. Therefore by Lemma (1: (3)) and Assumption (1: 2), the ex-ante funding probability,
The results in the two lemmas above help to derive the equilibria under the current regime when investors only find out ex-post about FSQ through litigation and in the setting where the disclosure of the FSI premium provides ex-ante information to the market
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium in Program I (current regime))
The quality of information is declining in the magnitude of management benefits, B. If the benefits from funding are very large relative to the penalties for overstatement -specifically, if the partial derivatives in each component x i of FSQ satisfy:
Then the equilibrium quality levels are for every firm to set x f = x where x is the minimum
FSQ. Consequently, as management perquisites increase, capital is allocated to low rate-ofreturn firms with greater probability.
Proof:
The manager's first-order-condition in FSQ (see Equation 4 ) is (the left-hand-side is positive by Equation 5):
L is convex and decreasing in x, so the level of x is decreasing in B. Under the condition in the hypothesis of this proposition, the maximand in Program 1 increases from reducing FSQ choices x for any prior beliefs. It follows that every firm will set the lowest level of FSQ in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 shows that if the benefits to funding are large enough, it sets off a "race to the bottom" in terms of FSQ. We now proceed to analyze the effects of introducing FSI. Before presenting that argument, we note that increasing one dimension of FSQ while holding others constant results in a reduction of the associated premiums. In other words, if y x then the premium associated with y is equal to or greater than that associated with x (with equality only if y = x). This is an immediate consequence of Assumption 2 where the probability of overstatement, and hence the associated liability, decreases as FSQ increases.
Assume that each firm purchases insurance and that the premiums charged to firms are observable. Suppose now that in equilibrium some firm f sets x f < x L , where x L is the quality choice of a firm receiving the highest possible private signal ω L . Then, the premium charged to firm f, π f , is strictly larger than π L -and investors will infer that firm f is of some type other than L. Thus, the inferred rate of return conditional on observing π f will be different from that based on the prior beliefs, ν. We will show that the disclosure of π f and attendant changes in the inferred rate of return lead to an equilibrium where all firms pool at the highest level of quality, x.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium with revelation of FSI premia (Program II))
When FSI is made available and premiums are disclosed, the equilibrium in which all firms set q f = q and the associated e is a rational expectations equilibrium irrespective of the benefit level B. The association between management benefits (perquisites) and misallocation of capital is negated through the provision of FSI (note, however, that in this program, we assume that the auditor will not misreport q to the insurer).
Proof:
Let x denote the highest quality choice and π the resulting break-even premium (see Program II). A rational expectations equilibrium is given by the following beliefs:
Under the belief system above, any type paying premium π f > π is perceived as type 1,
Therefore, the funding probability declines for every report j whenever x f x is selected (resulting in a premium π f > π).
Deviating to x < x makes every firm-type worse off so the equilibrium is for all firms to set
x.
The fact that defections from high quality are detected and immediately penalized results in the "flight to quality" documented in Proposition 2. Specifically, high-type firms gain from setting high FSQ. If low-type firms can muddy investor perceptions through low FSQ, high-type firms are also driven to exaggerate their own outcomes, leading to the result in Proposition 1. In contrast, in Proposition 2, by staying with high FSQ, good firms force others to follow suit or be identified as low types. Thus, low-type firms either abandon their quest for capital or accept a much lower probability of being able to mislead investors in equilibrium.
Although Proposition 2 demonstrates that with FSI the best possible quality implementation is an equilibrium, we cannot formally rule out all other equilibria. In general, one can obtain economically unintuitive sequential equilibria by specifying implausible off-equilibrium beliefs. The standard device to rule out "bad equilibria" is to impose restrictions on such off-equilibrium beliefs. In the simple case of two rates of return discussed in the example, a direct proof can be given that "pooling-at-the-top" is the only equilibrium that meets the universal divinity test.
Lemma 3 (Refinement Test)
Suppose L = 2 (as in our example). Then, the equilibrium where all firms pool at the highest level of quality x is the only one that meets the universal divinity refinement criterion.
Proof:
Auditor as an agent of the Insurer
In this section, we provide an economic rationale for shifting the responsibility for engaging an auditor from the firm to the insurer. We first discuss the situation where the firm purchases financial statement insurance but continues to hire the auditor (Program III). We emphasize that this is not an implementation of FSI -under FSI, the auditor is an agent of the insurer. Rather, we analyze this situation to highlight why FSI requires that the auditor stop being an agent of the firm. Let F (x, x, e) denotes the cost to the firm of getting the auditor to exert effort e and report the quality asx when the true quality is x. The auditor can be incentivized to report the true FSQ but the firm may not desire the true FSQ to be revealed.
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When the auditor continues as an agent of the firm truthful revelation of FSQ may be impossible ex-ante. However, litigation will typically reveal the true FSQ ex-post. The insurer will find it possible to make an adjustment σ(x, x) with the firm (because the insurer has a contractual relationship only with the firm). The key point is that this transfer is made ex-post and will not be known at the time of trading. Hence the firm does not internalize the cost of the low quality, ex-ante.
The initial premium observed by the market (Constraint (IP)) reflects the FSQ reported by the auditor to the insurance company rather than the true FSQ. Under these circumstances, the firm will always have incentives to set low FSQ to increase the probability of funding while incentivizing the auditor to over-report the FSQ. Market participants will anticipate this and set funding strategies based on low FSQ precipitating a "race to the bottom" as shown in the next proposition. 
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium with the Auditor as Firm's Agent)
Proof:
We begin by noting that the insurer is indifferent across breaking even ex-ante or ex-post.
From the insurer's perspective, the premium can be set based on the auditor's assessment 25 Note that the revelation principle cannot be invoked in our setting because the market's funding strategies have to be ex-post rational and any form of precommitment is precluded. In the absence of precommitment to funding schemes, the revelation principle cannot be invoked and the firm will not implement a system where the true FSQ is revealed.
of FSQ,x, and adjusted later through the transfer σ(x, x). As explained in the discussion preceding Equation (8), the firm can (with no extra cost) incentivize the auditor to report x = x by setting fees as follows:
Program III is therefore essentially equivalent to Program I: all firms induce the auditor to report x (with off-equilibrium beliefs that any firm choosing x f < x received signal ω 1 ). Therefore, all firms receive the premium corresponding to x and hence, investors learn nothing from observing the premium. For this reason, the ex-ante beliefs, ν, are not updated after observing the client-firm's insurance premium and the equilibrium in Program III then becomes the same as in Program I, that is, one where all firms set the lowest possible level of FSQ. Summarizing, the equilibrium is one where all firms choose the lowest level x but obtain premia corresponding to the highest level x. The equilibrium beliefs of investors is that FSQ is of the lowest type resulting in the same equilibrium as in Program I.
In contrast, Program IV leads to the same equilibrium as in Program II where all firms pool at the highest FSQ. The key step again is the updating of beliefs by investors after observing the premium. We assume that the insurer offers a schedule π(x) and sets the auditors transfer function σ(x, x) in such a way as to ensure that the auditor reveals x truthfully (see details in proposition 4). As a consequence, the equilibrium is the same as in Program II.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium with the Auditor as the Insurer's Agent)
When FSI is made available and premiums are disclosed, there is an equilibrium where all
In addition, if L = 2, this is the only equilibrium meeting the divinity criterion.
Proof:
Given that the auditor bears the cost of misreporting FSQ, they would typically choose to under-report FSQ. However, our assumption (CO) ensures that the firm can always get a fair premium elsewhere and so the insurer does not wish the FSQ to be under-reported.
Under these circumstances, the ex-ante premium π f correctly reflects the FSQ chosen by the firm. The inferences drawn from π f are the same as in Program II resulting in the same equilibrium where all firms pool at the highest level of FSQ.
An Example
We provide an example that demonstrates the effects of FSI in ensuring a "flight to quality."
In order to keep the example as simple as possible, we simplify the strategic role of the auditor and assume that the insurer can observe FSQ levels.
We assume that there are N firms each of which can have two possible rates of return, i.e., that there are two types (L=2). In addition, we assume that the quality variable, q = q, is one-dimensional and lies in [0, q], where q < 1. Next, we assume that the private information is perfect, and that ω l = 1, 2 reveals the expected rate of return as r l . We set Λ(q, e) = q (that is, x = q) and P (i|i, q, e) = q for i = 1, 2. So with FSQ q, the probability that the firm's type is reported correctly is q, and, as there are only two types, the probability of the firm being misclassified is 1 − q. Let the beliefs of investors be represented by ν i ; the firm that receives a private signal that it's rate of return is r i is expected to set its FSQ at ν i .
Assuming that each firm-type is equally probable, the inferred rates-of return are as follows:
The funding probability from selecting FSQ level q for a firm that receives private signal ω l = 1 is given by:
(recall that F denotes the distribution function of r * ). Becauser 2 >r 1 , it follows that the funding probability is strictly decreasing in q for every type 1 firm. In contrast, a firm with private signal ω l = 2 has a realized rate of return 2 and its funding probability is unaffected by the choice of q (because it's type cannot be overstated).
Assuming that the benefits of funding are sufficiently high, the firm with a low private signal will set q * 1 = 0. The implied type j of such a firm is always j = 2 (i.e., it is invariably misclassified). Thus the only report observable by investors is θ f = 2 for every firm. It follows that when r * ≤ r 1 +r 2 2 all firms are funded and when r * > r 1 +r 2 2 no firm is funded. As there are a total of N firms in the economy, N/2 of them (in expectation) are of high-type.
(1) Therefore, when all firms are funded, an expected amount of (N/2) units of capital are wrongly allocated and the associated loss is: (N/2)
(2) When no firms are funded, a total of (N/2) firms may wrongly be denied capital with associated loss:
The total negative returns associated with the misallocation of capital may then be written as:
In contrast, consider the case where the firm's choice of FSQ is known to the insurer who then sets a premium based on the level of coverage. We shall assume that the cost of coverage is strictly decreasing in quality, that is, π(q) is decreasing in q. As in Proposition 2, the following is seen to be an equilibrium:
• Both Firm types choose FSQ q = q, i.e., the highest quality financial statement, and pay the associated (low) insurance premium π(q).
• Any firm that is observed to have a premium π > π(q) is classified as a type-1 firm.
To see that this represents an equilibrium, let q * 1 represent the equilibrium FSQ choice of Firm f that has received private signal ω 1 ; either q * 1 < q or q * 1 = q. If, q * 1 < q, the premium rate for firm f, π(q * 1 ) > π(q), and its inferred rate of return is r 1 irrespective of the report. Therefore, it's probability of funding is F (r 1 ). If, however, Firm f mimics the high privatesignal firm and sets q * 1 = q, the inferred rates of return are given by
and the probability of funding increases by (1 − q)[F (r 2 ) − F (r 1 )] (i.e., by the higher probability of funding when the firm is reported as "type-2."). Note that the social loss now becomes:: (14) and (15) shows that the social loss is reduced through the provision of FSI.
Notice in this example that if a firm with private signal ω l = 1 sets q 1 < q, then the best response for the firm with the high private signal is to set q 2 = q -this separating policy leads to funding with probability F (r 2 ) at a minimum insurance cost. If, however, the firm with the high private signal sets q 2 = q, the best strategy for a firm with low private signal is to "mimic" and set q 1 = q. Mimicry increases the funding probability (and leads to the equilibrium described above). In contrast, when the type-1 firm sets q 1 = q and the type-2 firm sets q 2 < q the situation is untenable in equilibrium because by increasing q slightly, the type-2 firm reduces insurance costs but still separates itself from the type-1 firm. Thus, q 1 = q, q 2 < q should never be an equilibrium. Hence, the only plausible equilibrium is for both firms to set q i = q (see Lemma 3).
This example does not incorporate a role for the auditor, but a little reflection shows that the core intuition survives in a more complex setting where reports are influenced by an auditor acting under moral hazard. In particular, if the income of the auditor is determined by the insurer, sufficient incentives may be provided to elicit truthful revelation regarding the auditor's assessment of the firm's FSQ. Once FSQ is known (perhaps imperfectly) to the insurer, premium levels reveal this information to investors. In particular, when firms defect from the anticipated level of FSQ, that is, if a firm has been charged a higher than anticipated premium π f , investors find out about this before trading. This allows investors to alter their funding strategies and we are then essentially back in the situation discussed in the example.
The example has the characteristics of a signaling model where firms are separated out through the level of the insurance premium but the cost associated with signals has a special structure that should be clarified. In a standard signaling model, there is a difference in cost for a given signal across types (arising from an exogenous factor related to type). This difference deters the low type from choosing the same signal as the high type. In contrast, in the setting of the example, the cost of financial statement quality is the same for all firms.
The differential cost arises because the choice of high quality reveals the firms true type and is thus indirectly more costly for the low-type firm.
Let {ν 1 , ν 2 } = ν represent the beliefs of investors. In this example, the expected return on the high report, θ = 2, is some weighted average of r 2 and r 1 with the weights depending on ν; in addition, because Firm 2 always issues report θ = 2, the weight on r 2 is strictly positive. In contrast, the report θ = 1 necessarily implies that the rate of return is r 1 . Thus, rational investors would fund the report θ = 2 with a greater probability than the report θ = 1. In general, ensuring that higher reports are funded with greater probability requires some form of regularity assumption; in our formulation, this is the role of Assumption 1 (3).
The analysis in this Example assumes that the insurance premium is based on the actual level of FSQ chosen by firms. This was the setting analyzed in Proposition 2. More generally, the insurer relies on the auditor's assessment of FSQ to set the premium. In such a setting, the auditor reports FSQ strategically in order to maximize his own payoffs, and the revelation of the premium to investors does not break the "race to the bottom" with regard to audit quality so long as the auditor functions as an agent of management (Proposition 3). That is, firms would prefer to get the auditor to report a higher level of FSQ to the insurance company and thereby to investors than the one that has been chosen. As rational insurers and investors will anticipate this "bias", the equilibrium unravels to the lowest choice of FSQ. In contrast, when the auditor functions as an agent of the insurer, the pooling at the highest quality again becomes the rational equilibrium (Proposition 4). The Bayesian inference process that formalizes the relation between report and hidden type starts with the joint probability distribution of i, ω l , j at a given level of FSQ, x:
Equation (16) states that once the type, i, is realized, the probability of report j is determined by the actual value of i and the FSQ x, and is independent of the earlier imperfect signal ω l . Built into this equation is the fact that the joint distribution of i and ω l is unaffected by the choice of x -that is, the financial reporting choice affects only the reported rate of return and not the actual rate of return, r i . It follows that
The next step is to describe how the beliefs ν translate to a joint distribution of types and reports, P (i, j| ν). This process involves the following steps:
(1) Firm f receives a private signal ω l with probability P (ω l ). A firm receiving private signal ω l is conjectured to chose FSQ ν l .
(2) Under this belief, the joint distribution of reports and types for a firm receiving ω l is
Using (17) and the inference process above, the expected rate of return for a firm that has reported θ f = j is given by (note that the true type i cannot exceed j as errors are always overstatements):
At this stage, we make the important qualitative observation that all firms that issue a particular report θ f = j are assigned the same inferred expected rate of return. We contrast this with the situation where in addition to a financial report, θ f , firms also report their insurance premium, π f .
Denoting the inferred rate of return under beliefs ν conditional on both report θ f = j and
, we obtain:
The key difference between (18) and (19) is that the premium reveals something about the FSQ, and this in turn is reflected in the inferred rate of return through a posterior probability distribution about the private signal types that will end up with that premium. That is, after observing a premium π f , investors infer FSQ x f corresponding to π f and then use their beliefs ν to estimate the private signal of firm f. To illustrate further, suppose that a firm with the lowest private signal type ω 1 is assumed to choose a low FSQ ν 1 with a resulting premium π 1 . Then, conditional on observing that firm f has been offered a low premium π f < π 1 , the probability weight P (ω 1 |π f , ν) = 0. In other words, firms will be able to reveal their private signals through their reported premiums and thereby affect the inferred report-contingent rate of return.
The inferred rate of return for firm f depends on beliefs ν and can differ from the actual distribution, P (i|j, x f ). However, we impose the condition that in-equilibrium,
where x(ω l ) denotes the FSQ implemented by a firm with private information ω l . This is an important point that needs to be emphasized. Firms have the ability to distort the perceived level of FSQ but this is not a stable "equilibrium" situation. For an equilibrium to be sustainable, it must be optimal for firms and auditors to set FSQ levels that are consistent with investor beliefs.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that k > j. We have to show that a firm s with report θ s = k has a higher inferred rate of return than another, t, with report θ t = j.
From (18):
Define for 1 ≤ a ≤ j − 1:
Note that by definition, 
Equation (21) establishes thatr jf = E f [r|θ f = j, ν] is increasing in j establishing Lemma 1
(1). Next, investors provide funding whenever r jf ≥ r * establishing Lemma 1 (2). Taking expectations yields Lemma 1(3).
B Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose that some firm deviates to some off-equilibrium choice x f resulting in some premium π f > π and the off-equilibrium beliefs after observing π f are such that ω 2 is indifferent between choosing π or π f . We will show that ω 1 would then strictly prefer to choose π f .
Let x f be the FSQ correponding to π f . Noting that the lowest report j = 1 necessarily implies that the firm's rate of return is the lowest possible, r 1 (as all reporting erors are overstatements), F P (j = 1|π f ) = F P (j = 1|π) = F * (r 1 ). Therefore, denoting the belief about FSQ choice after observing π f by x f , the indifference assumption on ω 2 leads to:
Next, if the true type of the firm is 2, they will always get the report 2. Therefore, P (2|ω i , y) = P (2|ω i ) + P (2|1, y)P (1|ω i ) where P (.|ω i ) represents the probability of the true type and P (.|., y) denotes the conditional probability of the report given true type and FSQ y. Rearranging (22) and using the facts that: (i) F P (1|π f ) = F P (1|π) = F * (r 1 ) and (ii) P (2|ω j , y) = 1 − P (1|ω j , y) for every FSQ y we obtain:
The Right-Hand-Side of the equation above is negative because the probability of overstatement, P (2|1, y) decreases in FSQ. It follows that F P (2|π f ) − F P (2|π) < 0 (otherwise, both terms on the Left-Hand-Side are ≥ 0). Now by the fact that signals are "good news" about type, it follows that:
Substituting back into (23), the result is that:
Reversing the process by which Equation (23) was derived from (22) we obtain:
F P (1|π f )P (1|ω 1 , x f )+F P (2|π f )P (2|ω 1 , x f ) > FP(1|π)P (1|ω 2 , x)+F P (2|π)P (2|ω 2 , x)
that is, the type with private signal ω 1 would then strictly prefer to defect to x f . Therefore, under the Universal Divinity criterion, only the lowest ω-type actually is believed to be at the off-equilibrium premium π f , i.e., the equilibrium of Proposition 2 is the only one that meets the divinity off-equilibrium test.
When L ≥ 3, the uniqueness of the equilibrium in meeting the divinity test can be established if the equilibrium funding probabilities have the following characteristic: 
Assumption 2 (Inferences and Quality)
The condition in Equation 27 states that under beliefs of uniformly lower quality, the inferred rates of return change less sharply in the report. In other words, if investors believe that FSQ of every firm is lower, they place less reliance on financial reports. This is an intuitive economic condition and ought to hold quite generally. However, the derivation of (27) from the information structure of Assumption 1 presents technical difficulties.
Appendix 2: Description of the FSI Process
Financial statements insurance (FSI) is a market mechanism that can bring about significant changes in the structure and incentives of the auditing profession in such a way as to align auditors' and managers' incentives with those of shareholders and ensure better quality audits and better quality financial statements.
The FSI process begins with companies that choose to purchase financial statement insurance that provide coverage against losses suffered as a result of omissions and misrepresentation (O and M) in the financial reports. Companies desiring such insurance will solicit from insurance carriers in the year prior (year t-1) insurance coverage for their shareholders against losses caused by O and M in financial statements that occur during the covered year (year t). The carriers would engage an underwriting reviewer (that could be either an independent organization or the external auditor) who would assess the risk of O and M by examining the soliciting companies' internal controls, management incentive structures, the competitive environment, the history of past O and M, past earnings surprises and the market's responses to such surprises, etc. Detailed underwriting review reports would be the basis for the carriers' decisions on whether to offer coverage, the maximum amount of such coverage, and the associated required premium, or they may offer a schedule of coverage amounts and premia. The process is depicted in the diagram below.
Based on the insurance offers received, managers would put up in their proxies for shareholders' voting their own recommendation for buying FSI coverage at a given amount and premium (including zero coverage -no insurance). After the vote, the shareholders' approved coverage and premium (including the case of zero coverage) would be publicized, becoming common knowledge. Companies that opt for zero coverage and companies that chose not to solicit FSI coverage would revert to the existing regime under which they would hire an external auditor who opines on their statements. Companies whose shareholders approved insurance coverage would then select an external auditor from a list of audit firms approved by their chosen insurance carrier. The selected external auditor would be hired and paid by the carrier. Audit firms would also be rated by an independent organization (likely the same as the one that conducted the underwriting review). The selected external auditor would coordinate the audit plan with the underwriting reviewer to adopt it to the findings of the review. Eventually, the insurance coverage would become effective only if the auditor issues an unqualified opinion on year ts financial statements (sometime in year t + 1). If the opinion is not unqualified there would be no coverage, or else, the policy terms would be renegotiated. In either case (no coverage or renegotiated coverage and premium) the renegotiated terms would be publicized. For companies with effective coverage, shareholders' claims for recovery, within the limits of the policies, for losses caused by omissions and misrepresentations that occurred during the covered year would be settled through an expedited judiciary process. A judiciary body, agreed upon in advance by both the insured and the insurer, would submit the claims upon the detection of O and M, hire the necessary experts to estimate the damages, and agree on a settlement within the policy limits with the carrier; the latter may hire its own experts to analyze the damages.
